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Learning	is	a	Social	Activity	
By	C.A.E.	Goodhart1	
Financial	Markets	Group,	London	School	of	Economics	
	
	
Time	is	the	real	constraint	
	
In	my	earlier	textbook,	Money,	Information	and	Uncertainty	(1975),	I	began	with	the	following	
paragraph,	
“Time	is	the	ultimate	constraint	on	mortals.		Lack	of	time	contributes	also	to	limited	
information.		Shortage	of	time	and	information	make	it	harder	for	agents	to	achieve	Pareto	
equilibrium	matchings	of	wants	with	endowments.		This	had	led,	as	described	in	Section	1,	
to	the	evolution	of	several	social	artifacts	to	relax	such	constraints,	namely	the	
establishment	of	both	organised	markets	and	money.”	
	
In	much	of	the	standard	economics	literature,	the	constraint	that	is	used	is	either	income	or	wealth;	
but	this	is	a	secondary	and	adjustable	constraint.		If	I	devote	more	time	to	earning	work,	I	can	obtain	
more	income.		If	I	had	infinite	time	in	my	life,	I	could	have	infinite	income.		Similarly,	if	I	had	more	
earning	time,	I	could	add	to	my	wealth,	to	an	indefinite	degree.		At	any	point	of	time,	available	
income	and	wealth	are	given,	but,	over	time,	income	and	wealth	are	a	function	of	how	the	individual	
allocates	their	time.		Moreover,	of	course,	there	is	intertemporal	substitution.		If	I	spend	more	time	
on	trying	to	enhance	my	human	capital	at	an	early	age,	thereby	giving	up	my	use	of	time	in	other	
ways,	e.g.	for	recreation,	relaxation,	earning,	etc.,	then	I	may	be	able	to	enjoy	more	income	and	
wealth	at	a	later	age.		While	everyone	has	to	decide	how	to	use	their	available	income	best	at	a	
point	in	time,	the	main	optimisation	decisions	that	anyone	has	to	make	on	a	continuous	basis	is	how	
they	want	to	use	their	time	best.		Humans	have	no	ability	to	affect	the	inexorable	passage	of	time,	
(ignoring	space	travel	possibilities	and	other	such	sci-fi	fantasies).		At	best,	humans	may	have	a	
choice	between	a	healthier	lifestyle	and	enjoying	the	immediate	pleasures	of	food,	drink	and	drugs.			
	
	
1			My	thanks	are	due	to	George	Evans	for	guiding	me	through	parts	of	the	literature,	but	all	the	views	and	the	
errors	are	mine.	
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In	my	earlier	book	(ibid),	I	went	on	from	this	initial	discussion	of	time	as	the	essential	constraint	to	
discuss	how	markets	and	money	can	act	to	improve	our	allocation	of	our	available	time.		But	one	
feature	that	I	did	not	discuss	then	was	how	treating	time	as	the	ultimate	constraint	should	affect	
understanding	and	analysis	of	learning	and	expectations.		This	is	the	purpose	of	this	paper.		More	
generally,	it	is	my	conjecture	that	a	shift	in	macroeconomics	to	the	treatment	of	time	as	the	
effective,	ultimate	constraint,	would	have	significant	and	beneficial	effects	on	many	aspects	of	
macroeconomic	analysis.		But	I	have	been	waiting	in	vain	for	any	such	revolution.		It	simply	is	not	
happening.			
	
Learning	takes	time	
	
Again	as	a	generality,	learning	often	requires	little	or	no	expenditure	in	income,	nor	the	use	of	
wealth.		It	is	therefore	treated	in	much	of	macroeconomics	as	a	free	good.		As	a	result,	agents	are	
supposed	to	go	on	absorbing	information	and	learning,	until	their	expectations	approximate	to	the	
best	available	underlying	model	of	economic	system.		This	is	treated	as	‘rational’.		Admittedly	not	all	
learning	processes	are	free,	notably	now	higher	education,	and	books	are	expensive.		But	the	web	is	
largely	free	to	use;	and	primary	and	secondary	education	is	provided	free	by	the	state	to	all	
students.			
	
But	the	real	cost	of	learning	is	that	it	takes	time.		Every	hour	that	I	spend	learning	some	new	skill	is	
an	hour	that	I	cannot	use	for	some	alternative	purpose.		Many,	perhaps	most,	of	which	alternative	
uses	of	time	are	more	immediately	attractive	and	satisfying.		Note	that	the	young	are	prone	to	
prefer	holidays	to	being	made	to	study	at	school.		Because	parents	and	the	state	believe	that	the	
young	are	incapable	of	appreciating	the	underlying	longer-term	benefits	of	schooling,	the	young	are	
not	allowed	to	decide	for	themselves	on	their	allocation	of	time.			But	as	they	get	older,	everyone	
has	greater	freedom	to	allocate	their	scarce	and	limited	time	to	a	range	of	activities.			
	
With	learning	requiring	time,	and	time	being	scarce,	we	commonly	consciously	decide	not	to	learn	
about	most	aspects	of	modern	life,	and	we	tend	to	specialise	our	learning	into	those	areas	where	we	
feel,	rightly	or	wrongly,	that	we	have	some	comparative	advantage.		Take	languages	for	example.	
Since	English	has	become	the	common	universal	language,	a	large	proportion	of	English	speakers	will	
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not	bother	to	learn	a	foreign	language.		In	contrast,	most	of	those	in	professional	classes	in	non-
English	speaking	countries	will	spend	time	to	become	proficient	in	English.			
	
One	of	the	important	questions	in	education	is	the	degree	to,	and	age	at,	which	children	should	be	
allowed	and	encouraged	to	specialise.		What	are	the	macroeconomics	of	that	decision?			
	
A	normal	human	will	become	individually	expert	in	a	relatively	small	range	of	subjects.		Few	will	
know	how	electronics,	or	the	internal	combustion	engine,	or	television	actually	work.		We	just	take	it	
for	granted.		By	the	same	token,	only	a	tiny	proportion	of	the	population	has	studied	subjects	like	
climate	change	or	the	workings	of	a	modern	macroeconomy.		For	most	people	it	is	simply	not	worth	
the	time	and	effort	to	do	so.		And	this	is	a	rational	and	optimal	use	of	time.			
	
When	a	subject	arises	to	which	we	have	not	devoted	our	personal	specialisation	of	learning,	how	do	
we	form	an	opinion,	or	an	expectation	about	it?		For	example,	how	do	we	expect	climate	change	to	
influence	the	world	over	future	decades,	or	Brexit	to	affect	the	UK	economy	over	the	medium	term?		
What	we	do	not	do	is	to	go	back	to	the	original	scientific	articles	on	climate	change,	nor	do	we	
reread	the	latest	macroeconomic	textbooks.		In	most	cases	we	would	not	understand	them;	and	in	
any	case	the	cost	in	time	would	be	excessive.		So,	what	we	do	when	we	form	opinions,	and	also	
expectations,	about	such	issues	is	to	react	to,	often	simplified,	publicly	available,	narratives	about	
such	issues.			
	
Only	a	small	handful	of	academic	economic	studies	note	that	learning	takes	time,	and	that	such	an	
allocation	of	scarce	time	represents	a	cost.		These	include	such	experts	as	Evans	and	Ramey	(1992)	
and	Hommes	(2013).		But	even	in	these	examples	the	choice	that	they	present	lies	between	making	
no	attempt	to	learn,	and	using	an	accurate	model	of	the	economy	at	some	positive	cost	(Evans	and	
Ramey,	p.	210;	Hommes,	p.	15);	though	how	the	agents	get	hold	of	such	an	accurate	model	is	not	
described.	Neither	recognize	that,	when	uncertain	of	the	validity	of	our	own	forecasts,	the	standard,	
and	obvious,	response	is	to	ask,	or	consult,	someone	else	who,	we	have	reason	to	believe,	is	better	
informed	than	ourselves.		When	suffering	an	illness,	do	we	form	an	expectation	of	the	malady	and	
its	cure	by	reading	the	Lancet	or	a	medical	dictionary,	or	by	consulting	a	doctor?	
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Learning	is	a	social	exercise	
	
Basically	we	learn	from	others	in	the	majority	of	cases,	rather	than	from	our	own	independent	study.		
We	simply	do	not	have	time	to	do	the	latter.		When	we	form	our	opinions	and	expectations,	this	will	
largely	be	done	by	interactions	with	others,	either	directly	by	talking	with	people	whose	views	we	
take	seriously,	or	indirectly	by	reading	narratives	in	books	or	other	media.		Should	there	be	no	
particular	narrative	that	we	find	gripping,	the	default	position	in	almost	any	case	is	to	assume	that	
the	future	will	be	like	the	recent	past.			
	
But	when	events	change	violently,	and	the	more	important	such	events	may	be	to	ourselves,	the	
more	that	we	will	search	around	alternative	narratives	about	what	may	happen	in	future,	and	at	the	
limit,	but	very	rarely,	undertake	some	independent	learning	and	research	for	ourselves.		This	
suggests,	inter	alia,	that	strongly	autoregressive	expectations	will	be	most	common	when	the	system	
is	moving	in	a	normal	smooth	pattern,	whereas	expectations	will	come	to	focus	much	more	on	
narrative	models	for	future	developments	when	events	have	become	violent.		For	example,	when	
nothing	much	is	happening	in	the	Middle	East,	most	people	will	tend	to	assume	that	the	price	of	
petrol	next	month	or	next	year	will	remain	constant	at	its	present	level.		But	should	a	war	break	out	
in	the	Middle	East,	we	would	all	look	much	more	carefully	at	what	experts	were	saying	about	the	
implications	of	such	shocks.		Thus	the	idea	that	expectations	are	generated	in	some	constant	fashion	
is	itself	an	error.		The	generating	structure	of	expectations	is	itself	endogenous	to	the	distribution	of	
shocks	and	the	importance	of	the	outcome	of	such	shocks	on	our	own	individual	wellbeing.			
	
Most	studies	of	learning,	and	resultant	expectations,	treat	the	individual	as	being	an	isolated	atom,	
not	interacting	with	anyone	else.		This	is,	of	course,	nonsense.		As	already	noted,	most	of	our	
opinions	and	views	derive	from	social	interactions	with	others.		Since	the	world	is	complex	and	the	
future	unknowable,	there	are	many	alternative	ways	of	trying	to	explain	how	the	system	works;	in	
many	cases	these	cannot	be	verified,	e.g.	what	happens	after	death?		In	such	normal	cases	there	are	
a	range	of	narratives	about	such	issues,	and	the	individual	will	choose	between	the	narratives	that	
they	find	most	attractive	based	on	many	factors	such	as	subjective	personality,	the	persuasiveness	
of	the	narrative,	what	the	authorities	are	claiming,	etc.,	etc.		It	is	perfectly	possible	that,	from	time	
to	time,	we	may	focus	upon	an	invalid	narrative,	even	within	the	natural	sciences	(phlogiston).		The	
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likelihood	of	focusing	on	an	invalid	narrative	is,	of	course,	even	greater	in	the	social	sciences	and	
humanities,	let	alone	religion.			
	
With	competing	narratives	on	offer,	there	are	bound	to	be	bubbles	and	busts	in	asset	markets.		If	a	
narrative	indicating	that	asset	X	will	rise	in	price	appears	to	be	successful,	it	will	gain	adherents,	
particularly	when	people	see	others	making	money,	irrespective	of	the	fundamental	truth	of	that	
narrative.		But	when	the	bubble	finally	bursts	and	the	narrative	becomes	discredited,	then	a	rapid	
bust	is	likely	to	happen.		But	none	of	this	is	irrational.		It	simply	follows	from	the	fact	that	learning	
takes	time	and	is,	hence,	costly.		As	a	result,	we	try	to	choose	from	a	variety	of	narratives	about	what	
the	implications	of	any	action	might	be.		One	of	the	tricks	involved	in	this	exercise	is	to	make	one’s	
narrative	persuasive,	brief,	straightforward	and	simple.		For	example,	in	the	Brexit	referendum,	the	
phrase	‘Take	back	control’	was	hugely	influential,	although	more	detailed	analysis	would	have	
indicated	that	the	degree	of	extra	control	obtained	by	leaving	was	limited.			
	
The	idea	that	we	learn	individually,	by	a	Bayesian	process	of	updating	our	own	forecasts	on	the	basis	
of	the	divergence	of	our	prior	forecast	from	the	ex	post	actual,	is	deeply	engrained	in	macro-
economists.		In	practice,	we	explore	whose	other	forecasts,	and	narratives,	appear	to	have	explained	
recent	phenomena	better.		Hommes	(2013)	gets	nearest	to	this,	where	he	allows	his	subjects	to	
choose	between	four	different	heuristics,	adaptive	expectations	(ADA),	a	weak	trend	rule	(WTR),	a	
strong	trend	rule	(STR)	and	a	learning	anchor	and	adjustment	rule	(LAA),	(p.	33	and	Chapters	7	and	
8).		He	shows	that,	in	laboratory	experiments,	agents	will	switch	towards	the	currently	more	
successful	heuristic.		Such	social	learning	approaches	sit	within	a	broader	category	of	agent	based	
models,	a	field	with	a	substantial	literature,	see	e.g.	C.H.	Hommes,	2006.			
	
But	switching	from	one	simplified	heuristic	to	another,	e.g.	on	the	basis	of	past	performance,	is	
uncommon.		Instead,	we	are,	perhaps,	more	likely	to	switch	allegiance	from	one	expert	to	another,	
e.g.	on	inflation	between	Monetarists	and	Keynesians.		Such	a	switch	of	heuristics	is	not	unknown.		
Jim	Bullard,	another	expert	in	this	field,	(e.g.	Bullard,	Evans	and	Honkapohja,	2010),	has	argued	for	
switching	from	the	heuristic	that,	absent	shocks,	the	macro-economy	will	revert	to	its	trend	
equilibrium,	(as	in	most	DSGE	models),	to	the	heuristic	that,	absent	clear	evidence	to	the	contrary,	
the	economy	will	remain	in	its	current	state.	
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Nevertheless,	if	the	need	is	for	a	formal	model	of	learning,	the	best	currently	available	is	the	‘Social	
Learning’	approach	of	Arifovic,	Bullard	and	Kostyshyna	(2012);	also	see	Granato,	Guse	and	Wong	
(2008).		ABK	state	(p.	39)	that,	
“In	this	article	we	study	an	alternative	approach	to	learning,	one	that	can	be	viewed	as	more	
realistic	in	terms	of	actual	learning	in	complicated	market	economies.		In	it,	agents	are	
initially	heterogeneous	with	respect	to	the	models	they	use	to	forecast	the	future.		Forecast	
rules	are	updated	via	genetic	operators,	meant	to	simulate	the	process	of	learning	from	
neighbours	and	others	in	the	economy.		Results	are	not	analytic	but	are	based	on	
computational	experiments.		We	will	call	this	alternative	approach	social	learning.”	
	
The	results	of	such	exercises	do	not	suggest	that	reasonable	learning	processes	necessarily	converge	
to	a	rational	expectations	equilibrium,	and	in	many	cases	such	algorithms	can	allow	exaggerated	
volatility	to	recur,	i.e.	booms	and	busts.	
	
Conclusion	
	
To	conclude,	it	is	hard	to	disagree	with	Bray	and	Kreps	(1987),	who	wrote	(p.	623)	that,	
“Perhaps	the	most	accurate	statement	that	we	can	make	is	that	our	analysis	also	applies	to	
learning	about	equilibria	when	(i)	the	learning	is	rational	(Bayesian)	on	the	individual	level	
and	(ii)	agents’	models	are	consistent	(and	consistent	with	reality).		This	need	not	and	should	
not	be	read	as	an	assertion	that	only	models	that	satisfy	such	stringent	requirements	are	
interesting.		In	fact,	we	are	of	the	opinion	that	such	models	are	of	less	interest	than	those	
that	have	in	place	some	level	of	individual	irrationality	or	some	level	of	inconsistency	or	
both.		It	seems	incredible	indeed	that	agents	are	so	rational	and	consistent.		The	models	
analysed	here	provide	a	benchmark,	but	we	strongly	believe	that	this	is	a	sterile	benchmark	
and	that	there	is	much	more	to	be	learned	by	studying	models	that	are	somewhat	less	
sterile.		A	failing	of	economic	theory	in	general	has	been	that	it	has	proved	remarkably	
resistant	to	movements	away	from	models	with	full	rationality	and	consistency;	here,	
perhaps,	is	an	area	where	there	has	been	a	bit	of	progress,	and	the	promise	of	a	good	deal	
more.”	
	
7	
	
Over	30	years	on,	we	are	still	waiting	for	a	combination	of	good	sense	and	empirical	research	to	
break	the	grip	of	the	individual	rational	expectations	model.	
	
Much	of	the	behavioural	literature	has	focussed	on	various	features	of	human	behaviour,	such	as	
loss	aversion,	myopia,	short-term	impatience,	ignoring	extreme	possible	outcomes,	overweighting,	
recent	experience,	etc.,	etc.		All	of	these	are,	in	my	view,	largely	correct.		Certainly	the	work	of	the	
behavioural	economists,	such	as	Kahneman	and	Tversky.	(e.g.	1972,	1973,	1979,	1982,	1992,	2011),	
and	Richard	Thaler	(1994,	2009,	2016),	and	others	who	have	followed	in	their	path,	are	
praiseworthy;	and	indeed	show	important	aspects	of	human	behaviour	and	the	use	of	heuristics.			
	
But,	in	my	view,	most	of	the	literature	still	largely	misses	the	crucial	point.		This	is	that	the	process	of	
learning	by	oneself	is	extremely	costly	in	terms	of	time	allocation.		As	a	result,	almost	all	learning	is	a	
social	exercise,	whereby	we	learn	directly,	or	indirectly,	from	the	expressed	views	of	others.		Put	it	
another	way,	informational	contagion	is	baked	into	our	social	and	economic	systems.	
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